


IOM IRAQ

CITIES AS HOME

Understanding Belonging and
Acceptance Among IDPs and
Host Communities in Iraq



ABOUT IOM

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is the United Nations Migration Agency. IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organisation, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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ABOUT RWG

The Returns Working Group (RWG) is an operational and multi-stakeholder platform on returns, which was established in line with Strategic Objective 3 of the 2016 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan "to support voluntary, safe and dignified return" of IDPs, to monitor and report on conditions in return areas, and determine to what extent durable solutions have been achieved- or progress made- for returnees.

The key objective of the group is to establish coherence of information, data and analysis, strengthen coordination and advocacy, give guidance on activities related to the key areas, and enhance complementary action among its partners with the overall goal of supporting and reinforcing the national response to Iraq's coming reintegration challenge.

ABOUT SOCIAL INQUIRY

Social Inquiry is an Iraq-based not-for-profit research institution focused on influencing policy and praxis that establishes civic trust and repairs social fabric within and between fragile communities, and communities and the state. Its research focuses on three thematic rubrics: (i) social cohesion and fragility, (ii) transitional justice and reconciliation, and (iii) post-conflict political economy, exploring intersecting political, social, psychological, economic, and historical dimensions within these themes.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order to contribute to the measurement of local integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq, IOM Iraq, the Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry implemented an in-depth study of 14 urban locations in the country hosting a high density of families displaced due to the ISIL conflict.

Utilising data collected on IDPs' perceptions and living conditions in displacement (1,382 respondents) and on those of host community residents (1,437 respondents) in the same neighbourhoods as well as key informant interviews with local authorities and policy-implementers (40 interviews) in these areas, this work seeks to identify which factors help or hinder local integration – and those locations that are more (or less) conducive to this outcome.

This study is predicated on the understanding that local integration is not only based how on IDPs perceive their own belonging in the hosting location, irrespective of any stated intentions to stay or return, but also how host communities feel about accepting them.¹ Further to this, these feelings may themselves be influenced by the character of the urban areas where IDPs and host communities reside as well as the regulatory environment surrounding them.

As such, two sets of multivariate analyses were developed to evaluate these different dimensions of integration:

- What impacts the likelihood of IDPs to feel belonging to their host locations;
- What impacts the likelihood of host community members to accept the IDP population.

The different explanatory variables tested comprise a variety of indicators, including physical, cultural, and socio-economic factors of the displaced, the host communities, and the host locations. This analysis was further supplemented by detailing the instructions, regulations, and laws that are specifically related to the ability of IDPs to reside in cities in the country and enjoy the same rights as the host community. The findings presented here are generalisable to all urban areas hosting IDPs in Iraq.

Overall Measurement of IDP Belonging and Host Community Acceptance

IDPs' belonging was measured through their self-reported feeling of such as well as their feeling of being accepted by the host community. Overall, IDP respondents report a relatively positive sense of belonging and of acceptance. On average across the 14 locations, 62% of the IDPs felt complete or a lot of belonging to their place of displacement, while 75% feel accepted in similar degrees (i.e., completely or a lot). Host community members' acceptance of IDPs was measured by respondents' feelings about IDPs staying indefinitely in their locations and whether or not IDPs should have the same rights as residents. Across the 14 locations, only 12% of host community respondents indicated that they were upset by or against IDPs staying indefinitely in their locations. By and large, most respondents while not overly supportive of this prospect were nonetheless unbothered by it. Regarding attitudes on the rights IDPs should have as members of the community, the dominant view across all locations indicates an almost full support of equal rights as any other residents.

Determinants for IDP Belonging

With respect to IDPs, this study shows that factors linked to social cohesion in general play the predominant role in promoting feelings of belonging. These include individual factors, such as IDP respondents' trust in host community members and friendship ties with them, as well as location-wide factors such as living in areas where low levels of exclusion and discrimination are felt by IDPs in general. Such factors tend to be dynamic indicating that feelings of belonging seem to be a rather malleable outcome, shaped by the lived experiences of the IDPs in their respective urban environments and changes therein.

¹ A complementary forthcoming study on Urban Displacement in Iraq, by IOM Iraq DTM, explores protracted urban displacement, including an examination of IDP intentions.

Determinants for Host Community Acceptance

For host community members, on the other hand, their acceptance of IDPs is less predicated on their individual views of the displaced than on the overarching socio-ecological environment in which they reside. Acceptance then is linked to positive assessments of a location's security and competence of its local administration as well as who the IDPs are and how they are spatially distributed in the urban area. Specifically, support for IDPs among the host community is lower when they perceive IDPs are a security threat, when IDPs live in neighbourhood enclaves, and when the ratio of IDPs over the host community population is relatively large. All of these views may themselves seem to be strongly shaped by structural and demographic characteristics of the location which are frequently embedded in pre-existing fragility dynamics. Indeed, whether the overall surrounding environment in which host communities live have strong social safety nets, are prone to instability, or have general inequality influence their feelings around acceptance.



This report is part of a larger research project, *Cities as Home*, carried out by **IOM**

Iraq, the **Returns Working Group**, and **Social Inquiry**, that explores both drivers and deterrents of integration across 14 urban locations that still host the largest share of IDPs in the country. The outputs of this project also include factsheets for each location, four detailed case studies, and a brief on COVID-19 regulations and implications for local integration.

Regulatory Landscape Around Local Integration

While the national priority for durable solutions remains the return of IDPs, the current (as of 2020) regulatory landscape that surrounds IDPs in urban settings, as described by authorities, has not sought to directly create a hostile environment for those who still remain displaced. Rather, certain regulations that apply to out-of-camp IDPs are generally those applied to any individual seeking to reside in a location outside of their governorate of origin, whether they are displaced or migrants. Some thus may indirectly foster IDP integration if implemented as indicated and others may indirectly serve as impediments to it. The major exception to this is the more extensive security clearance processes in relation to the ISIL conflict that are particular to IDPs. They must go through this step, either in Federal Iraq or in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, to be able to enter (including those leaving camps) and stay in a location, move freely, and access basic rights and services therein, creating a dichotomy of IDPs, those who can access rights and those who cannot. This is a critical concern on its own and has significant implications for the ability to integrate and be accepted.

Conclusion

What connects these pieces together is that the nature of the location shapes integration outcomes, more than the characteristics of each individual IDP and host community respondent. It is, in fact, in urban environments with the 'right' combination of place factors where it is possible to simultaneously find both high proportions of IDPs feeling belonging and host community members feeling acceptance (and vice versa), thus, making these locations more (or less) conducive to integration than others. Taken together, this calls for a shift in thinking that puts displacement within, rather than separate from, the continuum of urban and community dynamics. In practice this means focusing interventions on the reduction of fragility as well as the attainment of rights, the elimination of discrimination, and the alleviation of poverty of all people living in a community, regardless of when they arrived.

1. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Cities in Iraq have absorbed the bulk of internally displaced persons (IDPs) since early 2014, when the ISIL conflict erupted across the northern and central parts of the country.

At the peak of the conflict, only 12% of the 3.4 million IDPs sheltered in formal camp settings, with the remaining 88% living in out-of-camp locations, mainly in urban areas. While IDPs began returning to their places of origin as early as 2015 as areas were retaken from ISIL, return rates have slowed significantly over the course of 2019 and 2020, leaving 1.4 million Iraqis still displaced, predominantly in urban areas. The majority of these IDPs have been displaced for more than five years already, indicating that they are either in protracted displacement,² moving towards local integration, or some combination thereof, and making it necessary to better understand the mechanics of the pathway towards this particular durable solution, irrespective of any stated intentions to stay or return.

Evidence from the field highlights this spectrum given that there is diversity in terms of how well integrated these IDPs are within their new communities, based on their perceptions and daily life in displacement:³

“ I used to feel that the other ethnic groups hated us when we first arrived here because I had heard that there are conflicts between the different ethnicities and sects who have certain identities but, when I became displaced to this area, my perceptions changed. I realized that they treat us with respect and appreciation and I realized that all I heard was made up ... [if conditions for return are not met] I will stay here and integrate to this society because I have no other choices. (IDP from Baiji, Salah al-Din Governorate, living in Altun Kupri, Kirkuk Governorate)

Whatever it takes not to be called IDP anymore. There have been attempts by people and authorities to make us feel welcome and in transferring the legal papers here. But it upsets me that my kids are still going to be called IDPs when they grow. There are a few people here with unmovable thinking

about us. (Pre-2014 IDP originally from Diyala Governorate, living in Samad, Salah-al Din Governorate)

[Being an IDP] is a mental state. But I do not have any other solution, so I just have to deal with it. People in Mosul are good to us, but this is how I feel. We will stay. (IDP from Tal Afar, Ninewa Governorate, living in Mosul Centre, Ninewa Governorate)

While these snapshots illustrate the different realities IDPs face, they provide only a partial window into the dynamics at play in shaping them. This underscores a key challenge in studying integration: that it entails not only understanding how IDPs perceive their own belonging, but also how host communities feel about accepting them. Further to this, these feelings may themselves be influenced by the character of the urban areas where IDPs and host communities reside as well as the regulatory environment surrounding them. Thus, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the measurement of local integration from both IDP and host community perspectives to identify which factors play a role in helping or hindering local integration, irrespective of stated intentions to state or return, and which ones matter most in sustainably achieving this outcome.

This study examines these questions through quantitative and qualitative research in 14 urban locations in Iraq hosting a high density of families displaced due to the ISIL conflict. Most of the evidence collected here points to the fact that the type and character of the locations that IDPs and the host community live in together matter for integration and, thus, feelings of belonging and acceptance are linked to levels of social capital, safety, exclusion and discrimination, confidence in local administrations, fragility of a location, and the character and spatial distribution of IDPs in the location. While it is nearly impossible to find a single location that performs well in every single one of these dimensions, most locations have at least some that do. What is needed then

2 Displacement is categorised as ‘protracted’ after one, three, or five years, depending on the actor and context. In Iraq, internal displacement is considered protracted after three years.

3 See, IOM and Social Inquiry, *Reframing Social Fragility in Areas of Protracted Displacement and Emerging Return: A Guide for Programming* (Erbil: IOM Iraq, 2017); Danish Refugee Council and Social Inquiry, *Social Dynamics in Tikrit and Al-Alam for Early Recovery Programming* (Tikrit: DRC, 2017); and IOM, Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry, *When Affordability Matters: The Political Economy and Economic Decision Making of Iraqi IDPs* (Erbil: IOM, 2019).

to foster smoother belonging and by extension acceptance are interventions that seek to address longstanding structural issues that impact the urban environments that both groups are in. In other words, interventions targeted specifically toward integrating IDPs, and not to the whole of the community through initiatives addressing structural issues, may instead have the opposite effect, making both belonging and acceptance more difficult.

1.2. CONCEPTUALISING INTEGRATION

Some of the remaining IDPs in Iraq may be ‘stuck’ in protracted displacement, while others consciously or not may be moving toward some form of local integration, whether or not this is their stated intention for resolving their displacement. As such, it is necessary to understand what factors matter for this to occur, irrespective of specific intentions, because it shapes the quality of life people experience where they currently are.

While displaced families might be able to get by in terms of livelihood opportunities, attainment of rights, and access to public goods,⁴ this is just one aspect of local integration. The concept must also be understood through other lenses: through IDPs’ own perceptions of being integrated, through host community’s views of IDPs remaining and integrating in

the long term, and through urban-wide factors – including the overarching policies applied to IDPs in a given location. The combination of all these have the potential to influence whether integration may occur or not.

For this reason, the key tenet of the analytical framework applied in this study positions integration in displacement as a two-way street between IDPs and their host communities (Figure 1). In other words, integration involves adaptation from both the displaced and those hosting them, as the process requires IDPs to *feel belonging* and host community to *be willing to accept them*. In addition, such a framework also highlights the role that local fragility and other place factors, including institutional policies, play in shaping communities’ perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours, which in turn, may help or hinder integration.

This study then compiles indicators among both population groups as well as the local environment itself to identify what makes locations more or less conducive for integration and seeks to answer the following questions: What set of IDP household characteristics and host environment factors influence the likelihood of IDPs feeling they belong to the hosting location? Do these factors also play a role in the likelihood of host communities’ willingness to accept these displaced populations? What pathways for intervention should be considered for supporting these factors?

Figure 1. Analytical framework applied to evaluate local integration



4 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), *Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010).

1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN

With the intention of being as generalisable as possible for Iraq, the study covers 14 of the top 25 urban locations with the largest number of IDPs still hosted. The list of locations selected for this study is shown in Table 1.⁵ It is important to note that some locations were prioritised over others because they are in close proximity to existing formal displacement camps that may close due to

the Government of Iraq's strategy of camp consolidation and closure. If these camps close, IDPs currently sheltered there may be more likely to move to their immediate surrounding urban areas as opposed to returning to their places of origin. The findings here would indicate how able these urban areas would be to absorb these potential new arrivals from camps should this strategy continue.

Table 1. Selected list of locations for data collection

LOCATION	GOVERNORATE	NUMBER OF IDPs (INDIVIDUALS)	RANK	CLOSING CAMP NEARBY?	SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE OF RETURNEES?
Erbil City	Erbil	136,884	#1		
Kirkuk City	Kirkuk	71,004	#2	Yes	
Mosul East	Ninewa	70,230	#3	Yes	Yes
Zakho Town	Dohuk	32,880	#6		
Dohuk City	Dohuk	28,578	#7		
Mosul West	Ninewa	25,206	#9	Yes	Yes
Tooz Khormatu	Salah al-Din	21,000	#10		Yes
Baghdad City	Baghdad	19,800	#11	Yes	
Samarra Town	Salah al-Din	17,910	#12		
Baquba Town	Diyala	16,374	#13	Yes	
Kalar Town	Sulaimaniya	16,206	#14		
Al-Amiriya Area	Anbar	13,734	#15	Yes	Yes
Musayab Town	Babylon	10,584	#16		
Khanaqin Town	Diyala	9,030	#25	Yes	Yes

Note: population figures from the time of data collection (Displacement Tracking Matrix Masterlist Round 113).

5 The original study design included 20 locations, but some of them had to be dropped due to the emergence of COVID-19, subsequent lockdowns in Iraq, and the health implications for both field teams and the populations sampled. Only data collection in urban Sulaimaniya Centre was conducted after the lockdown given the size of its IDP population (fourth largest location hosting IDPs). However, the sample was excluded from the analysis because of potential bias from the extraordinary social and economic situation at the time as a result of the public health crisis.

IDPs and the host community in each location were part of this study, in line with the two-way dynamics around integration highlighted in Figure 1. The identification of potential factors that may affect belonging and acceptance (and how to measure them) was guided by a review of technical and academic literature and existing monitoring frameworks taken from the fields of forced displacement,

refugee and migration, and post-conflict studies.⁶ Table 2 below summarises the main categories of the indicator framework developed for this study. From each category, specific indicators were defined and included in the survey tool developed for internally displaced and host community populations and key informant interview guides for local authorities and policy-implementers.

Table 2. Categories of indicators on integration applied in the study

INDICATORS INFLUENCING IDPs FEELING BELONGING IN PLACE OF DISPLACEMENT	Household characteristics	Displacement experience
		Livelihoods
		Identity attributes
		Personal wellbeing
		Housing situation
		Conflict and justice experience
		Connections with place of origin
	Interactions and experiences in displacement (individual-level place factors)	Relationship with host community
		Identity-based differences
		Marginalisation and rights
INDICATORS INFLUENCING HOST COMMUNITY MEMBERS ACCEPTANCE OF IDPs	Household characteristics	Safety
		Length of time in location
		Livelihoods
		Identity attributes
		Personal wellbeing
		Housing situation
		Conflict and justice experience
	Perceptions and interactions with displaced population (individual-level place factors)	Engagement with IDPs
		Pro-sociality towards IDPs
		Perceived impact of IDPs
COMMUNITY AND PLACE FACTORS (AGGREGATED AT LOCATION-LEVEL)	Marginalisation and rights	
	Spatial configuration of IDPs	
	Social inclusion and tolerance	
	Development	
	Safety	
	Quality of institutions	
Demographic composition		

⁶ See, for example, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration: A Pilot Study* (Eurostat European Commission, 2011); *Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In* (OECD, 2015); *Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)* (CIDOB and MPG, 2015); *Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library* (Joint IDP Profiling Service, 2018).

There are two important aspects to take from this framework that matter for analysis and operationalisation of findings. The first is that it captures not only household characteristics but also place-level factors that may shape belonging and acceptance. Integration outcomes may not only depend on the individuals themselves, but the environment in which they reside, whether or not they directly experience the specific indicator. What this means is that place factors can be measured in two ways, as described in Table 2: (i) at the individual level, which is linked to respondents' own direct experiences and interactions with their local environment; or (ii) aggregated at the location level, to measure the overarching socio-economic, institutional, cultural, and structural factors influencing the daily lives and perceptions

1.4. DATA COLLECTION AND APPLICATION

Data collection for this study consisted of two stages:

- Household survey among both IDPs and the host community in the 14 locations;
- Key informant interviews among local authorities and policy-implementers at governorate and district levels.

This mixed-methods approach was taken in order to best populate the indicator framework as some indicators require representative sampling and others more granular and specific information. How the data was gathered and organised is described in more detail below.



Household Survey

Surveys were conducted between December 2019 and February 2020 by IOM Iraq and Social Inquiry field researchers. The sampling aim was to gather a statistically representative sample with a 10% margin of error and 95% confidence interval – roughly this equates to 95 interviews per location and population group. Each location was

of residents as well as a location's overall ability to withstand shocks, including the influx of displaced people. Findings described in subsequent sections will refer to these two levels of analysis.

Second, some indicators refer to *fixed* characteristics that are static and unchanging (e.g., education levels or time in displacement) and other indicators refer to *dynamic* factors (e.g., perceptions of services or inequality, barriers to access livelihoods, or level of pro-sociality) that can be shaped either in the short or long term through programmes and policies. Taking these two types of factors into account serve as a guide for interventions in relation to integration that benefit both IDPs and host communities.

sampled as a separate unit of analysis. Within each location, specific target neighbourhoods were selected with probability proportional to size based on data from IOM Iraq's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) on the geographical presence of IDPs. Within each neighbourhood, IDP and host community populations were randomly sampled. For this study, the host community refers to those residents living within the same areas where IDPs are found.

The total sample size generated after conducting data cleaning consists of 1,382 respondents for the IDP population and 1,437 respondents for the host community population. The data is thus generalisable for the 14 locations covered.

The main purpose of the dataset generated is to conduct a multivariate regression analysis to identify which indicators play a role, and to what degree, in making a location more (or less) conducive for local integration. The statistical analysis builds two models: one correlating the indicators with the likelihood of IDPs feeling belonging, and another with the likelihood of host community members being willing to accept IDPs. An innovative characteristic of this analysis is that it incorporates multi-level modelling, combining the indicators at individual level as well as their aggregation at location level.⁷ In particular, these two levels are defined as follows:

- Level 1 indicators correspond to the **household factors and personal views and experiences of each respondent**, either IDP or host community. These are variables captured at the respondent level in the survey. They delve into specific indicators as defined in Table 2 above such as, housing situation or personal interactions with others in the community. Thus, they cover both personal characteristics as well as individual-level

⁷ A methodological overview of multi-level modelling and interpretation can be found in Ichiro Kawachi and S.V. Subramanian, "Measuring and Modeling the Social and Geographic Context of Trauma: A Multilevel Modeling Approach," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 19 no. 2, 2006: 195-203.

place factors related to experiences and interactions with the local environment.

- Level 2 indicators correspond to **location type variables**. There are several characteristics for each location that can be created through aggregating and averaging the individual survey responses per location or by incorporating new

indicators from secondary data. For example, percentage of individuals below the poverty line or that feel unprotected would correspond to this type of variable. To be able to work with Level 2 indicators for 14 locations within the regression model, some indicators were aggregated using exploratory factor analysis in order to create approximate location typologies (see Box 1 for these typologies).⁸




BOX 1: APPLICATION AND RESULTS OF THE EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AT LOCATION LEVEL

While there are several place factors that can be created from the survey responses or from secondary data, their incorporation into the statistical model as stand-alone variables is hampered by the fact that there are only 14 locations in the study. This limits the number of level 2 variables that can be added in the model without affecting its performance. To be able to incorporate them, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted which allows for the combination of the initial number of place factors into approximate typologies or location archetypes that can better represent the structure of the 14 locations than the single place factors on their own. The ten most relevant place factors were used in the factor analysis, providing a score for each location along three typologies created by the analysis:

- **Type 1 Location – Social Safety Nets:** The first factor is dominated by high loadings for feelings of protection, strong social interactions, service needs met, and low unemployment. Hence, the predominant interpretation revolves around a host community that feels protected and closely connected to each other, with basic needs satisfied. This factor is thus referred to as **locations with strong social safety nets**.
- **Type 2 Location – Prone to Instability:** The second factor captures locations that have directly and strongly experienced the ISIL conflict and are also characterised by high levels of pre-conflict poverty and a diverse ethno-religious population. This factor is thus referred to as **locations prone to instability**.
- **Type 3 Location – Unequal Societies:** The third factor score is dominated mainly by two variables, high economic inequality and low confidence in institutions, and to a lesser degree by high unemployment levels. This factor is thus referred to as **locations with unequal societies**.

The figures below provide a graphical representation of where, within the spectrum of these three typologies, each location stands based on the score calculated. More information on the factor analysis, including the individual variables used, the estimation method, and the factor loadings obtained, is provided in Annex 1.



8 While the sample size of locations (14) is considered low in standard terms for exploratory factor analysis, there is growing literature on the use of this method with small sample sizes, see, J.C.F. de Winter, D. Dodou, and P.A. Wieringa, "Exploratory Factor Analysis with Small Sample Sizes," *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 44, 2009: 147-181; Sunho Jung and Soonmook Lee, "Exploratory Factor Analysis for Small Samples," *Behavior Research Methods* 43, 2011: 701-709; and Sunho Jung, Dong Gi Seo, and Jungkyu Park, "Regularized Exploratory Bifactor Analysis with Small Sample Sizes," *Frontiers in Psychology* 11 art. 507, 2020: 1-12.

Sections 2 and 3 of this report dive into the analysis and discussion of the statistical model results for belonging and acceptance, respectively. The discussion of results aims to identify those indicators that seem to have a higher impact on local integration and those that play a more secondary role or no role at all. In doing so, it is important to look not only at whether indicators are statistically significant, but also how prevalent they are across the population assessed and where, across locations, they are more present and widespread.

Key Informant Interviews

To complement the household surveys and gain greater insight into the surrounding regulatory environment that may expand or limit the boundaries for IDP integration in a given location, Social Inquiry and IOM Iraq field researchers also conducted key informant interviews with relevant local authorities and policy-implementers, covering the sample locations at the district or governorate level. In general, most regulations related to IDPs are provided at the governorate level. The two exceptions to this are Tooz Khormatu and Musayab where district or subdistrict level data was collected. A total of 40 key informant interviews were conducted, with between 2 and 7 key informants per location.⁹ This data was collected between May and July 2020, either in person or by phone based on the public health regulations in place in response to COVID-19.



BOX 2: WHO ARE THE KEY INFORMANTS?

Because the emphasis of this analysis is on the regulatory landscape in general with respect to IDPs, the key informants selected for interviews needed to either have direct knowledge of this environment or be individuals involved in implementing these regulations and instructions. They included:

- Provincial Council members,
- Representatives from Mayors' offices,
- Representatives from police departments and relevant security entities, and
- Members of the Directorate Generals of Labour and Social Affairs, Education, Health, and Migration and Displacement.

The aim of the interviews was to determine what, if any, instructions, regulations, and/or laws are in place regarding IDP residence, movement, housing, employment, education, and healthcare access in displacement as well as any specific efforts related to integration as a durable solution. The focus here was on the environment prior to the public health crisis. Section 4 of this report details overarching trends as well as any location specific regulations that may shape the ways in which IDPs and host community members perceive each other and interact on a daily basis. The purpose was to more clearly describe what does or does not exist in terms of regulations; levels of compliance to any directives or their means of implementation are outside the scope of this study.

1.5. A DEEPER FOCUS ON THE LOCATIONS

The 14 locations examined represent, on a whole, significantly different historical, economic, and demographic contexts. There is diversity in terms of population size. The only relatively large cities in the sample are Baghdad, Mosul, Erbil, and Kirkuk. The other locations are a combination of smaller governorate and district capitals.¹⁰ Differences also apply in terms of governance with respect to their administration and level of decentralisation. The locations administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government are Erbil, Dohuk, Zakho, and Kalar, and they have a de facto separate governance system compared to the rest of study locations which fall under the Federal Government of Iraq. In addition, due to the federal nature of Iraq, governorates may apply their own policies and regulations with respect to displacement and integration (see Section 4).


Host community characteristics are also diverse across locations. For example, in their pre-conflict socio-economic position. Data on poverty from 2012 shows that some locations had a significant proportion of their population living below the poverty line (Figure 2), a factor that still matters for today's conditions given its structural nature.¹¹ Among these locations, Musayab is particularly worrying with more than half of its population living below the poverty line in 2012, but Mosul, Al-Amiriya, Baquba, and Baghdad also had significantly high levels of poverty relative to their population size.

⁹ Locations from Diyala Governorate were not covered due to deterioration of security conditions.

¹⁰ Official population figures are not available at location level and thus this comparison relies on qualitative estimates.

¹¹ Tara Vishwanath et al., *Where are Iraq's Poor? Mapping Poverty in Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2015).


Figure 2. Percentage of population living below the poverty line (in 2012)



Another aspect to consider is the ethno-religious diversity of the host community (Figure 3). Locations range from being very homogenous (Al-Amiriya, Erbil, Mosul West, and Kalar) to being very diverse (mainly Kirkuk and Khanaqin, but also Musayab, Tooz Khormatu, and Baghdad), with others falling

somewhere in between. It is important to pay attention to diversity not only for its social connotations, but also its political ones, as the influx of IDPs sometimes can impact and threaten the fragile identity balance in a location by affecting its demographic composition in the long term.

Figure 3. Current ethno-religious diversity among the host community respondents




Diversity is measured through the ‘fractionalisation index’, ranging from 0 (no diversity) to 1 (full diversity), calculated as the probability that two random individuals in the population belong to a different ethno-religious group.

In addition, most of the locations examined have past experience with forced displacement, in terms of both people fleeing from them due to conflict and in taking people in who have fled. A significant proportion of the host community in these locations have been displaced themselves at some point before 2014 due to violence, conflict, or government policy (Figure 4). These movements differ in terms of time periods and causes, with the locations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq mostly affected in the 1980s and 1990s and

the other locations during the 2000s. Most of the displacement in the last decade was internal and, as such, locations like Mosul, Kirkuk, Baquba, and Baghdad each hosted almost 100,000 IDPs during the sectarian war in the country in the mid-2000s.¹² These were significantly higher numbers than the population that is currently hosted in these locations. Some of these IDPs returned after this period, but many also remained in their hosting locations and thus are considered residents now, at least for the purposes of this study.

Figure 4. Percentage of host community respondents that experienced forced displacement before 2014




The last contextual factor to highlight for the host community refers to the different levels of impact they experienced due to the ISIL conflict. Some locations, in addition to now hosting some of the largest IDP populations in Iraq, have also borne the brunt of the conflict itself. In examining the

level of self-reported experiences of violence from the ISIL conflict (Figure 5), which can range from actual displacement to more conflict-related violence and destruction, Mosul, Tooz Khormatu, and Al-Amiriya, unsurprisingly, hold the highest rates of conflict impact on their populations.

¹² Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Iraq: Little New Displacement but in the region of 2.8 Million Remain Internally Displaced” (Geneva: IDMC / NRC, 2010).


Figure 5. Percentage of host community respondents affected by violent events between 2014 and 2019



Regarding the **IDP population** now living in these locations, the vast majority have been displaced for a relatively significant amount of time. In virtually all locations, more than 90% of the IDPs surveyed have resided in the location for three years or more. The only exception is Mosul West, which has a substantial proportion of IDPs who arrived in the location relatively recently. Across locations, the proportion of new arrivals is however likely to increase if camp closures take place.

In addition, locations are characterised by different geographical displacement patterns in terms of place of origin and displacement for IDPs (Figure 6). In locations such as Tooz Khormatu and Musayab, virtually all IDPs are originally from a different location within the same district. For Khanaqin, this proportion of local IDPs is as high as 84% and, for Mosul East, 58%. This situation may have an effect on displacement-return dynamics, not necessarily making return easier despite IDPs' proximity to their places of origin, but actually more complex because of the interlinked nature of these locations.¹³

Figure 6. Percentage of IDP respondents that are displaced within their district of origin




Data source: DTM's Integrated Locations Assessment IV (June 2019).

Finally, IDPs themselves have differing views on their emotional connection to their places of origin. This is seen in the answers to a binary question exploring rootedness to place of origin in which respondents are asked to choose between two extreme options regarding the possibility of living there again at any point in time, even if neither is exactly right (Figure 7). On average across locations, around

one third of IDPs indicate low rootedness to their places of origin. This percentage goes as high as 89% in Erbil and as low as 14% in Musayab. These findings indicate that not all IDPs may be open to the option to return, if other alternatives exist. While the difference is not significant, women report less rootedness to their places of origin than men.

Figure 7. Percentage of IDP respondents that indicated: "I would never live in my place of origin again in my life even if I did not have any option to live elsewhere."



13 In the case of Tooz Khormatu, all the IDPs are from the villages surrounding Tooz Khormatu Centre or from the nearby subdistricts of Al-Amerli and Suleiman Beg. Similarly, IDPs in Musayab are from the nearby subdistrict of Jurf al-Sakher and IDPs in Khanaqin are from Saadiya and Jalawla subdistricts. In all of these cases, a major reason for continued displacement has to do with blocked returns due to underlying tribal, sectarian, and security-related disputes. See, IOM, RWG, and Social Inquiry, *The Growing Role of Reconciliation in Return Movements: Snapshots from the Return Index*, Return Index Thematic Series Briefing 2 (Erbil: IOM, 2019).

2. IDPs: FEELINGS OF BELONGING

2.1. HOW TO MEASURE IDP BELONGING

This section analyses IDPs' feelings of belonging to their hosting locations as a proxy for integration through subjective measures as reported by the IDPs themselves. These

measures for belonging consist of how they report their actual degree of belonging to their place of displacement and their perceived acceptance by the host community (Table 3).

Table 3. Indicators used to measure IDP belonging

INDICATOR	MEASUREMENT			
Main Measurement: Belonging	How much do you feel you belong to [location of displacement]?			
	<input type="checkbox"/> Completely	<input type="checkbox"/> A lot	<input type="checkbox"/> A little	<input type="checkbox"/> Not at all
Alternative Measurement: Acceptance	Do you feel accepted as member of the society in [location of displacement]?			
	<input type="checkbox"/> Completely	<input type="checkbox"/> A lot	<input type="checkbox"/> A little	<input type="checkbox"/> Not at all

The survey results for these two indicators are shown in Figures 8 and 9, respectively. Overall, IDP respondents report a relatively positive sense of belonging and of being accepted. On average across the 14 locations, 62% of the IDPs felt completely or a lot of belonging to their place of displacement, while 75% felt accepted in similar degrees. In most locations, a large number of respondents are clustered around feeling *a lot* of belonging and *a lot* of acceptance, with only a minority opting for the most positive or negative response options.

Nevertheless, important differences exist between locations within this range. IDPs in areas such as Baghdad, Baquba, Musayab and, particularly, Samarra and Tooz Khormatu tend to be on the lower end of the spectrum for these indicators, with the majority reporting either not feeling belonging or not feeling accepted. At the other end of the spectrum, locations within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as well as Mosul West tend to show the highest rates of belonging and acceptance.

Figure 8. Measuring integration through **feelings of belonging**: How much do you feel you belong to the location of displacement? (% of respondents)



Figure 9. Measuring integration through **perceived acceptance**:
Do you feel accepted as member of the society in the location of displacement? (% of respondents)



2.2. DRIVERS AND DETERRENENTS OF IDP BELONGING

Factors that may drive or deter belonging among the IDP respondents are explored in detail below through a multivariate analysis (Table 4). The results are presented in an impact matrix table to simplify their interpretation. The coding used for this tabulation is derived from the statistical coefficients generated in the regression models, the results of which are fully listed in Annex 2.¹⁴ The number of signs illustrates the magnitude of the correlation, with those with a larger number of signs labelled as high relevance drivers or deterrents (depending on whether it has a positive or negative correlation).

The cross-analysis of explanatory variables in the multivariate model ultimately provides a comprehensive understanding of (i) what factors and circumstances characterise those IDPs who tend to feel belonging, as well as (ii) in which type of places and environments these IDPs are likely to be found more often. As such, the most important takeaway from the results in Table 4 is the predominant role that indicators linked to social cohesion have in promoting belonging. In particular, it is worth noting that:

- Social capital indicators such as trust in people and in authorities, and whether the IDP has established friendships with host community members seem to be strongly associated with positive outcomes on belonging, with no notable differences between men and women respondents.

- This is the case with IDPs’ reported satisfaction with their housing situation in displacement as well. Here, there is a gender difference in that women respondents are slightly less satisfied with their housing situation than men.
- Other protection-related dimensions such as the likelihood of experiencing exclusion (from employment, housing, or services) or restrictions on expression (religious, ethnic, or cultural) due to the IDP’s identity also strongly determine belonging. This is a location-wide effect, meaning that the respondent did not need to have experienced exclusion or discrimination directly, but rather to simply reside in an environment in which they occur for them to have an impact on belonging. Importantly, both men and women respondents report the same levels of exclusion and restrictions on expression, suggesting that there are no gender-based differences in experience in this regard.
- Virtually all of the dynamic indicators tested are statistically significant in the models, meaning that feelings of belonging seem to be a rather malleable outcome, shaped by the lived experiences of the IDPs in their respective urban environments and changes therein.

Results are analysed more in detail below, including a discussion on location- and gender-based differences.

¹⁴ The variable with the highest coefficient is used as a benchmark to rate the other variables in terms of their relative association over the outcomes assessed (belonging and acceptance). Given that the explanatory variables follow the same coding from the survey, it facilitates a relative comparison of coefficients.

Table 4. Summary results of the regression analysis for belonging of IDPs

TYPE	INDICATOR	BELONGING	ACCEPTANCE	EVALUATION
Static	Displaced within governorate	++	++	Secondary driver
	Length of displacement	++		Secondary driver
	Having property in origin	-	--	Secondary deterrent
	Daily labourer	-	-	Secondary deterrent
	HH member with functional difficulties	-		Secondary deterrent
	Having extended family in location	+		Secondary driver
	Member of an ER minority group			Secondary driver
	Unemployed			Not significant
	Rural origin			Not significant
	Living only among IDPs			Not significant
Dynamic	Trust in people	+++	+++	High relevance driver
	Having friends in host community	+++	+++	High relevance driver
	Satisfaction with housing	+++	++	High relevance driver
	Trust in authorities		+++	High relevance driver
	Movement restrictions	-	--	Secondary deterrent
	Feeling negatively judged / labelled	--	--	Secondary deterrent
	Having savings / assets	++	++	Secondary driver
	Poor self-reported mental health		++	Secondary driver
	Positive feelings of everyday safety		++	Secondary driver
	Having a financial safety net		+	Secondary driver
	Able to cover basic needs			Not significant
	Cultural distance with HC			Not significant
Location Type	High exclusion experienced by IDPs	---		High relevance deterrent
	Low freedom of expression for IDPs	---		High relevance deterrent
	Type 1: Strong social safety nets			Not significant
	Type 2: Prone to instability			Not significant
	Type 3: Unequal society	--	++	Mixed results


Note: gender, age, education variables were included as control variables but not reported here. Results are obtained from a multi-level linear probability model (see Annex 2 for full description).

High Relevance Drivers and Deterrents

Different measures of IDPs’ social capital are strongly linked with both measures of belonging. Where there is better **trust and friendship between IDPs and host community members**, IDPs report more positive levels of belonging. The most common situation to find is IDPs reporting relatively high rates of trust in the host community across locations (Figure 10), with a few notable

exceptions (Tooz Khormatu, Samarra, and Musayab) where trust is extremely low. Friendship, while not as frequently reported, follows a similar pattern. Trust in authorities is also a significant driver for belonging, specifically in relation to feeling accepted, and again follows a relatively similar pattern to the other two indicators.


Figure 10. Percentage of IDPs that responded ‘completely’ or ‘a lot’ on **trusting** residents, authorities, and having friends in the place of displacement



House satisfaction also plays a significant role in explaining feelings of belonging among IDPs, as the more satisfied they are with their housing situation, the higher belonging and acceptance they report (Figure 11). The prevalence of house satisfaction ranges from a maximum of 93% in Zakho to a minimum of 39% in Samarra, with the average across locations being only slightly above 50%. The majority of IDPs are currently renting houses or apartments. However, more often than not, locations with lower housing satisfaction tend to have more IDPs living in critical shelter – for example, 30% of respondents in Samarra are living in informal housing. The opposite holds true for those locations where IDPs own the property they are living in there. This IDP ownership is often found in

those locations characterised by high intra-governorate displacement, with property purchased prior to the ISIL conflict. One additional layer of difference in house satisfaction relates to the gender of the respondent: women are slightly less likely to be satisfied with their housing situation than men.


Figure 11. Percentage of IDPs that responded ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ with their current **housing situation** in the place of displacement



The final group of high relevance factors are deterrents to belonging and are related to environmental factors with significant protection implications for IDPs. The first of these is exclusion among IDPs. As would be expected, IDPs living in locations that feature **high levels of exclusion**, measured as either uneven access to services, employment, or housing, make them feel less belonging (Figure 13). This is the case

whether or not the respondent reported experiencing exclusion directly – rather it is a location-wide effect. In general, some level of exclusion is found across locations, with few exceptions. Exclusion from employment and housing tend to be most frequently reported, likely having to do with limited opportunities for employment and property ownership, in addition to discrimination IDPs may face by employers or landlords.

Figure 12. Percentage of IDPs that reported **facing exclusion** in their place of displacement (frequency)




The second deterrent to belonging, also measured as a place factor, relates to feeling restricted in **public expressions of identity**. The survey measured this through whether or not IDPs felt they could freely practice their religion, speak in their native language or dialect, or wear their traditional clothing in public (Figure 13). Generally

speaking, this type of discrimination is only anecdotally reported across locations, with the exception once again of Tooz Khormatu, Samarra, and Musayab, where more than half of all IDP respondents report issues in either of these three means of expression.¹⁵

15 It may be the case that IDPs feel the need to restrict their public expressions of identity because they are IDPs. It is also possible that host community members themselves also restrict their public expression due to the complexity of dynamics in these locations. These questions however were not asked to host community respondents, so it is not possible to extrapolate further on this.

Figure 13. Percentage of IDPs that responded not being fully able to **practice** their religion, **speak** in their language, or **wear** their traditional clothes in their place of displacement



Secondary Drivers and Deterrents

While all of the high relevance factors for belonging are dynamic in nature as per Table 4, secondary drivers and deterrents are both static and dynamic. These secondary factors are statistically associated with belonging, but their estimated effects are weaker than those with high relevance (as the name implies).

Turning to the static indicators first, the main findings are as follows:

- Indicators related to displacement experience, namely **intra-governorate displacement** and **length of displacement**, have a positive effect on belonging (see Section 1.5 for a description of prevalence and geographical differences).
- There is a mild negative effect on belonging from IDPs **owning a house in their places of origin**. This likely increases their rootedness to their places of origin and the potential to return there. Homeownership in origin is relatively widespread among IDPs, with 3 out of 4 respondents reporting so.
- Another minor deterrent to belonging is linked to the experience of working as a **daily labourer** in displacement. This nevertheless is the most common occupation among IDPs, with one third of male respondents listing this as their current job. The negative effect may come from poor working conditions and negative interactions on the job rather than solely based on levels of income, considering that being unemployed is not associated with less belonging.

Dynamics factors present more variety in terms of results and effects, as follows by thematic grouping:

- Physical and social barriers to interaction also serve as barriers to belonging. In particular, **movement restrictions** applied specifically to IDPs and IDPs’ feelings of collective **judgement or labelling** have a relatively strong negative effect on both belonging and feeling accepted. IDP movement restrictions were, however, only reported in substantial numbers in Tooz Khormatu, Samarra, and Musayab, with restrictions reported anecdotally in the remaining locations. Perceived negative labelling, on the other hand, was reported by one third of respondents overall and is widespread across locations.
- Economic factors play a relatively minor role in facilitating belonging, based on the results given by indicators such as whether respondents have **assets or savings**, or whether they have a **financial safety nets** (i.e., the capacity to borrow should they need to). Nevertheless, IDPs who have either of these tend to report more positive levels of belonging, indicating an increased ability to cope with displacement. Possession of savings or assets, while having the highest impact of the two indicators, is also the least prevalent among IDPs — only 8% of respondents across locations reported so, compared to 31% who reported having a financial safety net. The remaining proportion indicated no financial capacity to cope.
- Significant factors related to IDP wellbeing also contribute to higher feelings of belonging, namely **self-reported mental health** and feelings of **everyday safety**. The results indicate that there is a positive correlation between poor mental health and higher levels of feeling accepted. Although this seems counter-intuitive, poor mental health among IDPs may stem from experiences in fleeing their places of origin or pre-conflict issues and, thus, it could position them to feel more welcome in displacement as compared to their experiences in origin. The same pattern appears for feelings of safety as well.

3. HOST COMMUNITY: WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT IDPs

3.1. MEASURING ACCEPTANCE OF IDPs

Like belonging, acceptance is difficult to quantify in a completely straightforward manner. This section seeks to analyse the relative willingness of host communities to accept IDPs in their locations. It is important to note that, as described in Section 1.4, the host community here refers to the local residents living in the same neighbourhoods as the IDPs surveyed. Results are representative for this type of host community member, that is, one who lives in close proximity to IDPs in an urban setting.

Two key elements for measuring acceptance between groups, co-existence and equal rights, can be proxied through exploring host community's views on whether or not they would be comfortable with IDPs remaining in their locations and whether or not they feel IDPs should have the same rights as other residents. The following indicators in Table 5 were included in the host community survey conducted for this study.

Table 5. Indicators used to measure acceptance of IDPs by host community respondents

INDICATOR	MEASUREMENT
Main Measurement: Acceptance for long-term presence of IDPs	<p>How would you feel if post-2014 IDPs stayed in [location] indefinitely?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> I am supportive of it <input type="checkbox"/> I am not bothered by it <input type="checkbox"/> I am upset about it <input type="checkbox"/> I am completely against it
Alternative Measurement: Rights for IDPs	<p>How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: IDPs should have the same rights as residents of [location] as I do?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Strongly agree <input type="checkbox"/> Agree <input type="checkbox"/> Disagree <input type="checkbox"/> Strongly disagree

The survey results for these two indicators are shown in Figures 14 and 15, respectively. Across the 14 locations, only 12% of host community respondents indicated that they were upset by or against IDPs staying indefinitely in their locations. This percentage is only relatively high in Erbil, Kirkuk, Zakho, Kalar, and Tooz Khormatu, but it never exceeds one third of respondents. The majority of respondents in most locations are however clustered into the category of *not bothered by it*. While this feeling does not equate to a warm welcome for IDPs, it may represent a passive acceptance of co-existence with IDPs in the long term. And more to the point, host community respondents, by and large, may not see this as a pressing concern.

Finally, regarding attitudes on the rights IDPs should have as members of the community, the dominant view across all locations indicates an almost full support of equal rights as any other residents, irrespective of whether they stay or not. An average of 91% of respondents across locations agreed with the statement. There are relatively small pockets of disagreement in Dohuk and Zakho, both locations in the same governorate.

Figure 14. Measuring acceptance by **long-term presence of IDPs:** How would you feel if the IDPs stayed in this location indefinitely? (% of respondents)




Figure 15. Measuring acceptance by **attitude to IDPs rights:** How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "IDPs should have the same rights as residents of this location as I do." (% of respondents)



3.2. DRIVERS AND DETERRENDS OF HOST COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE

Table 6 lists the factors that may drive or deter acceptance of IDPs among host community respondents through a separate multivariate analysis. The results are, again, presented in a summary table to simplify their interpretation, with the full regression results available in Annex 2. The discussion below covers (i) what factors and circumstances characterise those host community members that tend to accept the long-term presence of IDPs and support their equal rights as residents, as well as (ii) the typology of locations and environments such host community members are more frequently found in.

The most important takeaway from the results in Table 6 is the fact that acceptance of IDPs seems to strongly depend on structural and demographic characteristics of the location (especially regarding how IDPs fit in to it). In particular, it is worth noting that:

- Two of the three high relevance indicators are linked to perceived quality of life in the location. Positive assessments of the location's safety and the competence of its administration are related with higher levels of acceptance of IDPs. Importantly, differences emerge based on the gender of the respondent. While men and women report

feeling protected in equal measure, women report less confidence in their local administrations than men.

- A unique aspect of the host community analysis is the fact that most location-wide place factors are statistically significant in explaining acceptance. The first set of these indicators illustrate that who the IDPs are and how they are spatially distributed in the urban area also matters for acceptance. Support for IDPs among the host community is lower when they perceive IDPs are a security threat, when IDPs live in neighbourhood enclaves, and when the ratio of IDPs over host community population is relatively large.
- The second set of location-level place factors that matter for acceptance relate to the type of locations in which respondents reside and which affect the community as a whole. These factors consist of the three location typologies identified in the factor analysis (locations with strong safety nets, that are prone to instability, or that have unequal societies).¹⁶

Results are analysed more in detail below, including a discussion on location- and gender-based differences.

Table 6. Summary results of the regression analysis for willingness to accept IDPs by the host community

TYPE	INDICATOR	LONG-TERM PRESENCE	RIGHTS FOR IDPS	EVALUATION
Static	Experienced violence in the 80s-90s	--	--	Secondary deterrent
	Member of an ER minority group	-		Secondary deterrent
	Daily labourer			Not significant
	Unemployed			Not significant
	Living in neighbourhood for >10 years			Not significant
	Not a home owner			Not significant
	Born in a different governorate			Not significant
	Experienced violence in 2003-2018			Not significant
	Has an IDP neighbour			Not significant

¹⁶ See Box 1 in Section 1.4 for more detail on these location typologies.

Table 6. Summary results of the regression analysis for willingness to accept IDPs by the host community (continued)

TYPE	INDICATOR	LONG-TERM PRESENCE	RIGHTS FOR IDPS	EVALUATION
Dynamic	Feeling protected from external threats	+++	+++	High relevance driver
	Confidence in local administration	+++	+	High relevance driver
	Believe IDPs pose a security threat	---		High relevance deterrent
	Pro-sociality toward IDPs	++	+	Secondary driver
	Satisfied with level of services	++		Secondary driver
	Cultural distance with IDPs	--		Secondary deterrent
	Having a financial safety net	+	+	Secondary driver
	Having savings / assets	+		Secondary driver
	Stronger identification with ER group	-		Secondary deterrent
	Believe diversity does harm			Not significant
	Has interacted with IDPs			Not significant
Location Type	High rate of intra-governorate IDPs	++	++	Driver
	High rate of IDPs living in enclaves		--	Deterrent
	High rate of IDPs over HC	--		Deterrent
	Type 1: Strong social safety nets		++	Driver
	Type 2: Prone to instability	--		Deterrent
	Type 3: Unequal society		++	Driver
	High rate of IDPs from rural origin			Not significant


Note: gender, age, education variables were included as control variables but not reported here. Results are obtained from a multi-level linear probability model (Annex 2 for full description).

High Relevance Drivers and Deterrents

The most relevant factor, above any other, in explaining host community acceptance of IDPs relates to safety and protection perceptions. In particular, where host community respondents feel **protected and safe from threats**, they are more likely to respond positively to IDPs' integration. In general, this factor is relatively prevalent across locations

(Figure 16), with the majority showing percentages close to or higher than 90% of respondents feeling protected. In the four locations where protection is less strongly felt (Samarra, Baquba, Tooz Khormatu, and Zakho), acceptance of IDPs is likely to be significantly lower.


Figure 16. Percentage of host community members that responded 'completely' or 'a lot' to **feeling protected** from external threats



Another high relevance factor also linked to physical protection is whether the host community **perceives that IDPs pose a security threat**. This negative view is not particularly extended across locations (Figure 17), with

only Zakho featuring a relatively high percentage (59%) and Kirkuk, Samarra, and Erbil close to 30%. Individuals believing IDPs are a threat are significantly less likely to accept them in the long term.


Figure 17. Percentage of host community members that agreed IDPs pose a security threat for the community



The last high relevance factor is linked to the confidence respondents have in their **local administration's capacity and competence** (Figure 18). To capture this sentiment, the survey included a question asking host community respondents whether or not they agreed with the following statement: if residents paid taxes, authorities could provide better public services. Where respondents answer positively to this, they also tend to be more positive toward their willingness to accept IDPs in their locations indefinitely and

for them to have equal rights as residents. Contrary to the other two indicators, such confidence in authorities' capabilities tends to be relatively low across the board with very few exceptions. On average across locations, approximately 41% of respondents had positive views in relation to institutional competence. Of further note is that women overall tend to have less confidence in the competence of the local administration than men.

Figure 18. Percentage of host community members that agreed with the statement "if we paid taxes, authorities could provide a better public service" (**confidence** in administration's capacity)



Secondary Drivers and Deterrents

As with IDPs, the secondary drivers and deterrents for host community acceptance of the displaced are divided into static and dynamic factors as per Table 6. Exploring the two significant static factors first, the main findings relate to more historical experiences of violence and identity as follows:

- Host community respondents who **experienced violence pre-2003** are less likely to feel positively about IDPs staying in their communities indefinitely. Most of the respondents indicating this tend to be located in Kurdish-inhabited locations including Dohuk, Erbil, and Kalar and, as such, these attitudes tend to be linked with the violence perpetrated by the former regime in Iraq which likely accounts for the uneasiness regarding the presence of mostly Sunni Arab IDPs now.
- Host community respondents who are from **ethno-religious minority groups** are also less likely to want IDPs to stay in their locations in the long term. This may relate to their concerns over changes in population composition, affecting their representation in the community and in governance.

Dynamic factors present more variety in terms of results and effects, as follows by thematic grouping:

- The most important secondary driver of host community acceptance is linked to the concept of **pro-social behaviour**, that is, actions carried out by individuals that benefit other people or society as a whole (e.g., volunteerism, cooperation, or caregiving). High levels of *pro-sociality* are positively correlated with both indicators of host community acceptance. In the survey, such action is proxied through a hypothetical behavioural game where the respondent is asked to divide a sum of money (\$100) between an IDP and a host community member.¹⁷ On average, respondents tend to divide the sum 60-40 between the IDP and host community member, respectively. This pro-social behaviour in favour of IDPs implies a bias toward charity on the part of respondents overall and perhaps a recognition that IDPs are more vulnerable than other residents. Results by location range from a high of \$78 to IDPs in Baghdad to a low of \$43 to IDPs in Zakho.

- Host communities who are relatively **satisfied with current levels of public service provision** are more likely to accept IDPs. On the contrary, lower IDP acceptance in the long term is linked to greater frustration over service provision. This may be related to the perception that hosting displaced communities may increase the competition for limited resources (notwithstanding host community recognition that the main causes for poor provision may have to do with structural factors linked to financial crisis and incompetence or corruption rather than the presence of IDPs).
- Economic factors play a relatively minor role in facilitating acceptance, based on the results of indicators such as whether respondents have **assets or savings**, or whether they have a **financial safety net** (i.e., capacity to borrow should they need to). Host community members who have either of these tend to report more positive levels of acceptance. This implies that those residents who are less likely to accept IDPs in the long term are those who tend to struggle financially – this is roughly the case for one third of host community respondents on average across locations.
- The first critical secondary deterrent to IDP acceptance relates to host community members' perceptions of their values as compared to others. In particular, the relative **perceived cultural distance** between host community respondents and their views of the average IDP in their locations.¹⁸ As would be expected, host community members who perceive IDPs to be culturally different from them are less likely to accept them. However, by and large, the majority of host community respondents do not show particularly high cultural distance values between themselves and IDPs, irrespective of the ethno-religious backgrounds of either. In fact, only 7% of respondents registered a moderately high value for this cultural distance measure.
- The second deterrent relates to host community self-identification. A lower sense of **national identity** among host community members (that is, feeling closer to their ethno-religious group identity than to an encompassing Iraqi one) indicates that they are slightly

17 Specifically, respondents were asked the following (no actual money was exchanged): Imagine you have \$100 to give in charity. You have the option to give this money to a randomly chosen post-2014 IDP and a randomly chosen host community member. To each of them, you can decide to give anything between \$0 and \$100. How would you split this money between the IDP and the host community member? The total has to equal to \$100.

18 Cultural distance is measured by comparing responses to an index exploring perceptions on four attributes (religion, tribe, leisure, and equality). Respondents are asked, first to evaluate how important these attributes are for themselves, and then later in the survey, how important these attributes are for a typical IDP in their location. Total cultural distance per respondent is computed as the average difference between attributes, with zero meaning that answers to all attributes for both the respondent and a typical IDP in their location are the same.

less inclined to hold positive views on IDPs remaining in their locations indefinitely. This likely has to do with demographic balance where this lower sense of national identity is felt particularly among non-Arab respondents. Therefore, this view is particularly high in areas within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq or that have more ethnically diverse populations.

The Role of Location-level Structural Factors

Unlike with IDPs, location-wide place factors do play a significant role in shaping residents' attitudes toward integration. This means that the host community respondents found in locations that feature the structural drivers (or deterrents) listed in Table 6 are more (or less) likely on average to accept IDPs in the long term, irrespective of their individual characteristics.

An important methodological aspect for evaluating place factors in the statistical model, however, is that they cannot be categorised into high relevance or secondary impact factors.¹⁹ Thus, they are only referred to drivers or deterrents, without further qualifications. All place factors in the model but one (the ratio of IDPs of rural origin) are statistically significant to varying degrees and can be classified as those related to the nature of the hosting environment and those that pertain to the character and spatial pattern of IDPs in these locations.


With regard to the first set of factors on the nature of the hosting environment, the locations under study could be categorised into three broad typologies (see Box 1 in Section 1.4). Type 1 are those locations with **strong social safety nets**; Type 2 are those locations that are **prone to instability** due to high pre-conflict poverty levels, ethno-religious diversity, and greater experiences of violence due to the ISIL conflict; and Type 3 are characterised by **general inequality**. Locations that fall into Type 1 or 3 classification tend to act as drivers for host community acceptance of IDPs in terms of their having rights as residents. Type 2 locations, on the other hand, seem to serve as deterrents for host community members accepting IDPs staying indefinitely, likely linked to the fact that, compared to the other two location typologies, residents here across the board are struggling to get by amid relatively more regular upheavals.

Turning now to the character and spatial pattern of IDPs, the main location-level driver of integration is the **level of intra-governorate displacement** in the location, that is, the percentage of IDPs originally from the location's governorate over the total IDP population in the location.

In particular, a large proportion of intra-governorate IDPs increases the overall acceptance of IDPs by the host community across both outcomes. This finding is expected given the already existing familiarity that people may have with each other.

In addition, there are two inter-related deterrents to pay attention to, density of IDPs over the host community and a measure of how spatially spread out (or not) IDPs are within a location. With respect to the first deterrent, the higher the **ratio of IDPs to host community population**, the lower the acceptance host community members express on the long term stay of IDPs. A similar trend emerges regarding the spatial pattern of IDPs, in that locations in which **IDPs live in enclaves** rather than spread throughout the location tend to have lower rates of host community acceptance of them in terms of having the same rights as residents. This may be due to the fact that if IDPs are living relatively separately from the host community, they may not view the displaced in the location as a part of it. Figure 19 illustrates the distribution of locations across the two inter-related indicators described here and highlights the fact that no single location fits squarely within the top right quadrant which represents the most extreme combination of indicators (high density of IDP coupled with their concentration in enclaves). On the contrary, when locations have a high density of IDPs they tend to distribute themselves throughout a location, and vice versa.

Figure 19. Measures of IDP density and ratio of IDPs living in enclaves per location



19 The reason for this is because the units in which the indicators are measured are different in each case and not comparable among themselves and the rest of the survey-generated indicators.

4. REGULATORY LANDSCAPE AROUND LOCAL INTEGRATION

After examining individual and location-level factors that influence local integration, it is also critical to understand the policy and regulatory landscape in which both are embedded. While it is difficult to determine exact formal policies in Iraq, it is possible to highlight the sum of instructions, regulations, and laws that are specifically related to the ability of IDPs to reside in cities in the country and enjoy the same rights as the host community.

The following sections identify a number of trends, as of early 2020, across key sectors linked to durable solutions for internal displacement as detailed by relevant local authorities and policy-implementers at governorate and district levels from 40 key informant interviews. It is important to note, once again, that the level of compliance and means of implementation of these directives are outside the scope of this analysis.

The most important takeaway to note include the following:

- While the national priority for durable solutions remains the return of IDPs, the current (as of 2020) regulatory landscape that surrounds IDPs in urban settings, as described by authorities, has not sought to directly create a hostile environment that would compel them to return to their places of origin. Rather, many regulations that apply to out-of-camp IDPs are generally those applied to any Iraqi seeking to reside in a location outside of their governorate of origin, whether they are displaced or otherwise. These regulations vary by location,²⁰ where some may indirectly foster IDP integration if implemented as indicated and other may indirectly serve as impediments to it across locations.
- The critical difference in regulations between IDPs and more regular internal Iraqi migrants relates to specific security clearance measures in place in relation to the ISIL conflict. Though these measures vary by location, it is unique for IDPs. This process is the necessary prerequisite for all IDPs to be able to enter (including for those leaving camps) and stay in a location, move freely, and access basic rights and services therein. It in effect creates a dichotomy of IDPs, those who can access

rights and those who cannot. This is a critical concern on its own and has significant implications for the ability to integrate and be accepted.

4.1. IDP INTEGRATION AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF GOVERNMENT PRIORITY FOR RETURN

The starting point for examining the regulatory landscape in relation to integration is to recognize that the Federal Government and Kurdistan Regional Government priority remains focused on the return of IDPs to their areas of origin. While the bulk of return movements by non-camp urban IDPs have been voluntary, other return movements have resulted from more coercive regulations in line with this return priority. As such, the following general conditions can be extrapolated from past and current actions across the locations examined in this study:

- **Regulations from IDP places of origin:** Because the national priority for durable solutions is return, governorates of origin have sought to bring their populations back. This usually came through instructions from the Federal Government recalling displaced government employees to return or risk losing their positions and/or offering benefits and support to IDPs to further facilitate their return, with specifics adapted as appropriate by relevant governorates whose populations remain displaced.
- **Regulations from IDP places of displacement:** Governorates have often sought to consolidate their urban IDP populations to host only those who are

²⁰ Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have de facto separate administrations. Nevertheless, the result for the IDP is the same regardless of specificities: they need to be security cleared in relation to the ISIL conflict and then need permission from governorate authorities to reside there (this latter process applies for any Iraqi moving to a new governorate). Specific processes vary in each governorate and locality.

originally from within that governorate by attempting to send other IDPs back to their own governorates of origin. As a result, IDP population size dropped suddenly in many governorates including Anbar, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din between 2017 to 2019.²¹ It should be noted, however, that despite these measures, most governorates still have a relatively diverse IDP population in terms of governorate of origin.

- **Regulations for IDPs within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq:** While those displaced within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq all come from outside of it (or from the territories disputed between the two administrations), authorities within Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya have no instructions, regulations, or laws to prompt the return of IDPs. Thus, those IDP return movements that have occurred are reported to be either spontaneous or linked to Federal Government regulations applied to all IDPs. It is worth noting that these governorates still contain some of the highest numbers of IDPs across locations studied.
- **Regulations on blocked returns:** Among the current IDP population, there are some who are blocked from returning to their places of origin for ethno-religious, security, and/or political reasons. These IDPs are spread across the locations under study here and have varying regulations applied to them based on context. The case of IDPs from Jurf al-Sakher (Babylon Governorate) stands out in particular given both their unique circumstances and the official response to it. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by both national authorities and international stakeholders to facilitate safe returns for this population who have all been blocked by security actors since 2014 for political and sectarian reasons, the Government deemed this situation intractable. As such, much of this population remains in either neighbouring Musayab (Babylon) or in Al-Amiriya (Anbar), where local authorities understand their presence is relatively fixed and permanent at present.

4.2. SECURITY CLEARANCE IN RELATION TO THE ISIL CONFLICT

Overall, IDPs need identity documentation to obtain security clearance from the appropriate security actors within the governorate or district, as relevant, in order to be able to enter and stay in the locations studied.

Authorities in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din Governorates indicated that they also provide assistance to those IDPs who need to replace lost civil documentation to begin this process. This security clearance in relation to the ISIL conflict is the prerequisite for accessing any other rights in relation to durable solutions – in this case local integration. This holds true for IDPs seeking to enter any governorates, irrespective of being within Federal Iraq or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, though each have different procedures for this process. While serious human rights and protection concerns have consistently been raised regarding various clearance procedures,²² only authorities in Tooz Khormatu specifically reported that certain IDPs face many difficulties and serious risks in seeking to obtain security clearance linked to their ethno-religious identity amid other dynamics.

With respect to IDPs with alleged ISIL affiliation, authorities report that this group is heavily monitored and where possible kept separate from both other IDPs and the host community either by placing them in camps or in heavily restricting their movements if they are within the urban environment, as in Tooz Khormatu. By and large, there seems to be limited opportunity for such individuals to integrate into non-camp displacement locations. Authorities in Anbar indicate that those individuals who formally abandon family members with ISIL connections would be allowed to return to their places of origin, after undergoing either a tribal or security mechanism to resolve outstanding issues with residents there. Within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Dohuk has specific practices related to IDPs with alleged ISIL affiliation. In particular, family members of alleged ISIL members are not allowed to cross into the governorate, however, they will not be arrested if they attempt to do so, but rather will be turned away. Those suspected of being ISIL members will be arrested and turned over to relevant authorities. In addition, any IDP resident charged with committing a crime, will be expelled from the governorate.

4.3. RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT

Obtaining security clearance then allows IDPs to seek residency documentation for the specific governorate they displace to. This entails sponsorship from a mukhtar (and in some cases two additional host community members). IDPs seeking to reside in Kirkuk City, however, require

21 IOM, RWG, and Social Inquiry, *Reasons to Remain: Categorising Protracted Displacement in Iraq* (Erbil: IOM, 2018).

22 See, for example, Alexandra Saieh, "Ignoring Iraq's Most Vulnerable Displaced Families Undermines U.S. Stabilisation Agenda in Iraq," *Just Security*, 18 August 2020.

sponsorship from an existing resident before being able to enter the urban area from the camps in which they were first placed before then gaining mukhtar sponsorship. Upon receipt of requisite residency paperwork, an IDP is considered a 'resident' in terms of being able to find a place to live and move around within the location and outside of it. One exception to this is found in Mosul, where there is an increased presence of security forces in some IDP areas; these actors apply movement restrictions and more regular monitoring and follow-up on the populations residing there.

Similar practices also apply within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in terms of security clearance in relation to residence. However, authorities here mentioned that Arab IDPs specifically require residency documentation in line with existing protocols for any Arab individuals seeking to reside there, regardless of displacement status. IDPs also have to register with relevant security actors if they seek to move houses within the area. Residency documentation for displacement areas within Federal Iraq or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq allows for travel between the governorates that fall under their respective control. Travel between Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq requires additional approvals from either side, depending on IDP residency.

Finally, while residency enables IDPs to remain in a location, it does not confer voting rights for that location per se. The overall legal system in Iraq does not easily allow individuals to vote for candidates or platforms outside of one's governorate of origin. However, in order to ensure voting rights for IDPs, special mechanisms are set up by the electoral commission to allow them to vote in their displacement locations in national and provincial elections for their governorates of origin.²³

4.4. ACCESS TO HOUSING INCLUDING HOME AND PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

As noted above, access to out-of-camp housing is predicated on IDPs being granted security clearance and residency, across all locations. IDPs are also free to choose where in each location they would like to live, with the exception of Kirkuk given its additional sponsorship requirements which may limit IDP options and in Tooz Khormatu where restrictions are placed on which neighbourhoods IDPs can live in based on their identities due to ongoing ethno-religious tensions in the urban area. Most of the IDPs in the urban locations studied live in rented houses. Erbil, Kirkuk, and

Sulaimaniya authorities indicate that some rent support is available to IDPs through the government, NGOs, and, in the case of Erbil, the church. Christian IDPs in Baghdad also receive rent subsidy from the church.

In all but one location, authorities noted that those IDPs who cannot afford to pay rent have built irregular settlements to live in. Eviction from these settlements, however, by local authorities or landlords, is reportedly not widespread. In Musayab, for example, instructions against irregular housing settlements exist, but are not implemented toward IDPs due to their economic situation and the fact that they have nowhere else to go as they are blocked from returning to their place of origin.

There is more variation across locations in relation to whether or not IDPs can buy or own property in displacement, with regulations changing over time. At present, the displaced, particularly Arab IDPs, are now able to purchase houses in Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniya under their own names – a change from past restrictions on direct Arab ownership of property in these areas in general. The displaced are also able to purchase homes in Anbar, with authorities encouraging IDPs from Jurf al-Sakhar in particular to do so. Musayab authorities also indicate the ability of IDPs to purchase homes, if they can afford it. More restrictions are found in Ninewa and Kirkuk, where IDPs from outside of these governorates are ineligible for homeownership. While IDPs in Baghdad initially faced no restrictions on purchasing property or land to construct within it, this has changed over time for two reasons: first, to encourage the displaced to return to their places of origin and second, because of the limited capacity of many neighbourhoods to house more people and extend public service provision to meet their needs.

4.5. ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR PROTECTIONS

With respect to employment, there are reportedly no specific policies to incorporate IDPs into the workforce nor are there regulations restricting them from seeking jobs in the public or private sectors in displacement. This being said, authorities indicated it is still difficult for IDPs to find sustainable livelihoods in general.

Examining the public sector first, IDPs are able to apply for job openings, but per authorities in Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya, host community applicants are prioritised for positions. In Erbil, however, authorities noted that the influx

²³ These mechanisms have been in place since before the ISIL conflict in relation to previous internal displacement waves.

of IDPs with higher educational backgrounds and specific technical skills (e.g., doctors and teachers) were incorporated into the public sector to fill outstanding vacancies and to utilise, among others, their Arabic language skills to better serve the IDP communities residing there who, by and large, do not speak Kurdish.

Within the private sector, across locations, IDPs are again technically able to open businesses or work as private employees – and most tend to be daily labourers. Authorities in Anbar described a planned Ministry of Migration and Displacement programme to support 30 new IDP businesses in the governorate, however this was halted due to lack of funding, the COVID-19 crisis, and the political situation in the country. At the same time, these authorities also noted that IDPs from Jurf al-Sakhar, residing in Al-Amiriya, have been able to establish farms and fish farms in the area, providing needed jobs to the host community.

Finally, as with access to employment overall, there are no specific labour rights protections for IDPs within the formal public or private sectors. Existing labour rights protections do not extend to the informal sector, where most IDPs find employment in general. This was indicated as a concern in Dohuk, where local restaurant and shop owners sometimes fire non-Muslim IDP workers given host community customer complaints and boycotts because of their employment. There are no protections for these workers against this discriminatory practice within the Labour Department nor are any authorities issuing instructions to business owners to stop it.

4.6. ACCESS TO EDUCATION

There are two approaches to accessing education that IDP students can take across all locations for public education, based on their choice and availability: 1) integrate into host community public schools or 2) enrol in separate, designated schools. These separate schools for IDPs have been set up either because of limited capacity in existing schools or because of differences in language and curriculum. This latter point is particularly salient for displacement locations within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where public education is conducted in Kurdish and follows a different curriculum than that taught in Federal Iraq, where the IDPs come from. Those IDP students who can afford it are also able to attend private schools across all locations. Access to education is once again predicated on IDPs having appropriate civil documentation and clearance. However, there are some exceptions to this, applied specifically in the education

sector. In Musayab, for instance, authorities waived this requirement for IDP students (not their family members) with missing documentation from Jurf al-Sakhar to facilitate their access to education. To account for the fact that IDP families may have arrived in their displacement locations outside of the school year, some localities, for example in Salah al-Din Governorate, opened summer schools for displaced students.

With respect to higher education, IDP students are able to enrol in and attend universities in their places of displacement. For those students, who were enrolled in universities in conflict-affected areas prior to the onset of the conflict, alternate or remote campuses were established in areas of displacement for them, (e.g., a Mosul University campus in Kirkuk).

4.7. ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

Healthcare in both public primary health clinics and hospitals are provided at no cost to IDPs, as it is for all residents. Quality of health services vary by area for all residents, with Baghdad and Kirkuk authorities noting that services are particularly poor due to lack of budget and staff. In general, national and international NGOs have provided aid and support to hospitals and clinics as well.

The only exception to relatively unimpeded access to healthcare concerns IDPs with security restriction issues, primarily those with alleged ISIL affiliation. These individuals are required to obtain permission from security forces to visit hospitals for care.

5. CONCLUSION

This study explored local integration across three dimensions:

IDP perspectives on belonging, host community perspectives on acceptance, and the regulatory landscape surrounding them:

- For IDPs, what helps in increasing **feelings of belonging** are indicators related to social cohesion as a general concept. These include individual factors related to the place they live in, such as IDP respondents' trust in host community members and friendship ties with them, as well as location-wide factors such as living in areas with low levels of exclusion and discrimination felt by IDPs in general.
- With respect to the host community, their **acceptance of IDPs** is less predicated on their individual views of the displaced than the overarching socio-ecological environment in which they reside. In other words, acceptance seems to be strongly shaped by the structural and demographic characteristics of the location which are frequently embedded in pre-existing fragility dynamics (poverty, insecurity, diversity, poor institutional functioning, lack of trust, etc.).
- Finally, regarding the **regulatory landscape** of the locations under study, while return is the national priority for IDPs, there seem to currently be no specific plans directly for or against local integration. In general, regulations that apply for internal Iraqi migrants also apply for IDPs. The major exception to this is the more extensive security clearance processes in relation to the ISIL conflict that IDPs must go through to be able to enter (including from camps) and stay in a location, move freely, and access basic rights and services therein, creating a dichotomy of IDPs, those who can access rights and those who cannot.

What connects these pieces together is that the nature of the location shapes integration outcomes, more than the characteristics of each individual IDP and host community respondent. It is, in fact, in urban environments with the 'right' combination of place factors where it is possible to simultaneously find both high proportions of IDPs feeling belonging and host community members feeling acceptance (and vice versa), thus, making these locations more (or less) conducive to integration than others. Locations such as Tuz Khormatu, Samarra, Musayab, and Baquba perform poorly in terms of integration outcomes precisely because they are riddled with structural issues that negatively affect both communities. Kirkuk City and Al-Amiriya, on the other hand, while far from perfect, are less impacted by negative place factors, and in turn have significantly better integration outcomes.

Taken together, this calls for a shift in thinking that puts displacement within, rather than separate from, the continuum of urban and community dynamics. In practice this means focusing interventions on the reduction of fragility as well as the attainment of rights, the elimination of discrimination, and the alleviation of poverty of all people living in a community, regardless of when they arrived.

STATISTICAL ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FOR THE EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS

The aim of applying an exploratory factor analysis on the location-level data, which consists of 14 locations and 9 variables, was to generate a smaller number of location-level variables that approximated different typologies in which to classify each location. These typologies served as Level 2 variables in the regression analysis (see next section).

As a result of applying this method, three factors, or typologies, were identified as shown in Table A1. These three factors explained 76% of the variance. The definition of the factors is described in detail in Section 1.4 of this report.

Table A1. Exploratory factor analysis results (loadings ≥ 0.60) for the study locations

INDICATOR	FACTOR LOADING
Factor 1	
Strong protection	0.877
Strong interaction	0.871
Services needs met	0.824
Unemployment	-0.626
Factor 2	
ISIL conflict experience	0.882
HHs below poverty line (2012)	0.864
Ethno-religious diversity	0.827
Factor 3	
Economic inequality	0.817
Confidence in institutions	-0.800

Rotation method Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation converged in 4 iterations.

ANNEX 2. RESULTS FOR THE STATISTICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The regression models developed in this study consist of a multi-level linear specification. Multi-level models present the advantage that they can separate out the individual (first level) and community-wide (second level) effects on the studied outcome, in this case, integration. For this study, given the variability in the local geographies where IDPs are found, the driving assumption is that the integration process is also geographically variable and related to experiences with the environment. Thus, the model results and discussion divide the variables between these two levels. Further description of these levels is provided in Section 1.4 of the main report.

There are four models developed in total, two for the IDP sample using two proxies for feelings of belonging and two for the host community sample using two proxies for willingness to accept IDPs. The dependent variables are specified linearly as a Likert scale.²⁴ The model specification without predictors (null model) is used to see how much variance is produced at Level 1 (from individual respondents) and how much at Level 2 (from community-wide factors). For these four models, Level 1 variance accounts for between 68% and 86% and Level 2 for between 14% and 32% of the total variance.

Tables A2 and A3 provide the regression outputs for the IDP and host community models, respectively. Given that the model specification is linear, the coefficients have to be interpreted as the increase in the dependent variable's Likert score, which ranges from 1 to 4, with 4 being the most positive response. The difference between the number of observations reported in the tables and the total number of interviews collected corresponds to indicator missing values.

²⁴ Given that the dependent variable is based on a Likert scale question, an ordered logistic model regression could also be applied. For the sake of interpretability, however, the linear model was chosen.

Table A2. Results of the regression for the IDP sample

TYPE	INDICATOR	BELONGING	ACCEPTANCE
Demographics (Level 1)	Is a female respondent	0.116***	0.032
	Age	-0.209**	-0.127
	Education level	-0.058	0.132**
Static (Level 1)	Displaced within governorate	0.130**	0.277
	Length of displacement	0.169*	0.047
	Having property in origin	-0.115***	-0.111
	Daily labourer	-0.087*	-0.082
	HH member with functional difficulties	-0.075*	0.022
	Having extended family in location	0.086**	0.004
	Member of an ER minority group	-0.092	0.004
	Unemployed	0.013	0.043
	Rural origin	0.051	-0.010
	Living only among IDPs	0.039	0.058
	Dynamic (Level 1)	Trust in people	0.563***
Having friends in host community		0.640***	0.369***
Satisfaction with housing		0.343***	0.171***
Trust in authorities		0.021	0.362***
Movement restrictions		-0.110*	-0.294***
Feeling negatively judged / labelled		-0.193***	-0.210***
Having savings / assets		0.141**	0.169***
Poor self-reported mental health		0.099	0.186***
Positive feelings of everyday safety		0.149	0.221***
Having a financial safety net		0.026	0.093**
Able to cover basic needs		-0.043	-0.023
Cultural distance with HC		-0.049	0.055
Location Type (Level 2)	High exclusion experienced by IDPs	-0.289*	0.091
	Low freedom of expression for IDPs	-0.551*	-0.155
	Type 1: Strong social safety nets	-0.020	-0.047
	Type 2: Prone to instability	-0.075	-0.008
	Type 3: Unequal society	-0.172**	0.073**
	Intercept	1.873***	1.415***
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS		1,193	1,196
NUMBER OF CLUSTERS (LOCATIONS)		14	14

Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

Table A3. Results of the regression for the host community sample

TYPE	INDICATOR	LONG-TERM PRESENCE OF IDPS	FULL RIGHTS FOR IDPS	
Demographics (Level 1)	Is a female respondent	0.192***	0.081**	
	Age	-0.026	-0.252**	
	Education level	-0.086	0.037	
Static (Level 1)	Experienced violence in the 80s-90s	-0.273***	-0.162**	
	Member of an ER minority group	-0.179*	0.025	
	Daily labourer	0.108	-0.098	
	Unemployed	0.033	-0.016	
	Living in neighbourhood for >10 years	0.091	0.034	
	Not a home owner	-0.104	0.075	
	Born in a different governorate	-0.031	0.053	
	Experienced violence in 2003-2018	-0.005	0.007	
	Has an IDP neighbour	0.034	0.009	
	Dynamic (Level 1)	Feeling protected from external threats	0.284**	0.236***
Confidence in local administration		0.373***	0.099*	
Believe IDPs pose a security threat		-0.313***	-0.071	
Pro-sociality toward IDPs		0.701***	0.344***	
Satisfied with level of services		0.240***	-0.115*	
Cultural distance with IDPs		-0.479***	-0.075	
Having a financial safety net		0.109*	0.097**	
Having savings / assets		0.178**	0.021	
Stronger identification with ER group		-0.133**	-0.071	
Believe diversity does harm		-0.064	-0.049	
Has interacted with IDPs		0.044	-0.062	
Location Type (Level 2)		High rate of intra-governorate IDPs	0.912***	0.601***
		High rate of IDPs living in enclaves	0.004	-0.563**
	High rate of IDPs over HC	-0.477***	-0.301	
	Type 1: Strong social safety nets	-0.025	0.108*	
	Type 2: Prone to instability	-0.542***	-0.066	
	Type 3: Unequal society	0.021	0.251**	
	High rate of IDPs from rural origin	0.122	-0.282	
Intercept	3.391***	2.709***		
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS		1,140	1,139	
NUMBER OF CLUSTERS (LOCATIONS)		14	14	

Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

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